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PREFATORY REMARKS  
 
 
I have included a couple of chapters with no actual contents 
but instead a short description of what they will contain 
when written sometime in the future. This is done so as to 
give the reader an idea of the structure in the thesis and thus 
also the author’s overall chain of reasoning. 
 
The symbol ‘#’ can be found on numerous pages of the 
paper and simply denotes a missing source or a point as of 
yet not completely written. I have tried to limit the presence 
of these flaws in the paper but plenty still remain, and you 
should disregard these. 
 
On a final note, the paper almost exclusively deals with only 
one of the two problematiques that my thesis eventually will 
cover, i.e. resource allocation (the second being service 
adaptation). 
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1.1 ON GEPPETTO AND THE PINOCCHIOS 
”If politics is regarded as a conflict over whose 
preferences are to prevail in the determination 
of policy, then the budget records the outcome 
of this struggle”, 
#Wildavsky, 1986: 9. 
T o quote Wildavsky, budgeting is the life blood of government and in his words, the budget provides us with 
the annals of the great battle for the pieces of the societal pie – 
or in Lasswell’s terms: the political struggle for who gets what, 
when and how (#). But much can be said for instead referring 
to both budget and government in plural, as citizens from all 
parts of the world daily are confronted with a bewildering array 
of public authorities that enjoy more or less autonomy from 
their respective Capitol Hills; talk of the budget in singular 
therefore seems ill guided, at best. This is surely true of the 
case under investigation here – Denmark, if not generally: 
Scandinavia – where local authorities account for the torso, 
arms as well as the legs of the welfare state, figuratively 
speaking – and that quite irrespective of how we may try to 
measure it. But without the head, the body is of little use, and 
this is where capitol hill enters the picture; in metaphorical 
terms, the structure of the Danish public sector is one of a 
plethora of more or less autonomous Pinocchios, until recent 
times 282 counties and municipalities but now 103, and one 
Geppetto, the state, with a lot of strings to keep track of – and 
disentangle if things should go awry. Expressed in different 
terms, a decentralized system presupposes the marriage of two 
very different logics often at odds with each other: that of 
centrally held macroeconomic responsibility, Geppetto’s 
unceasing worrying for his wooden son, with local autonomy 
and local accountability, the easy-living Pinocchio unceasingly 
trying to break free from the strings that constrain him. This is 
potentially a recipe for trouble, and as we shall see, very much 
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validates Allison’s claim that where you stand depends on 
where you sit (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) – which in this case 
means either behind a desk on capitol hill or in a town or 
county council farther from the pinnacles of power. But 
perhaps this view is a bit too antagonistic: metaphorically 
speaking, the relationship between the aforementioned can 
probably better be understood as similar to the Confucian 
concept of yin and yang: as complementary opposites 
(Wikipedia, 2006); that is, a necessary and also beneficial 
antagonism. Furthermore (as also elaborated in later chapters), 
although each depends on the other, their interests, concerns 
and so forth are neither in perfect overlap nor mutually 
exclusive – but rather somewhere in between1. The discrepancy 
between these two logics (or lack thereof) is the point that this 
thesis pivots around, which brings me to its subject matter. 
The fundamental structure sketched out above seems a 
fair representation of both the past (at least post-1970), present 
and future Denmark, albeit she recently was subjected to strong 
winds of change – winds instigated by a slim parliamentary 
majority in the summer of 2004. After a long night of wheeling 
and dealing, Denmark woke up to the second complete 
remapping of her communal landscape in the relatively short 
span of just four decades. What happens when a decentralized 
system like the Danish is subjected to fundamental reform? 
That is the subject matter of this thesis, more specifically the 
winds of change that the current local government reform will 
usher in for all concerned parties at both central and local 
                                     
1 Or expressed by way of familiar terms from game theory: this situation 
is not one of win-win, the example par excellence of this being free trade 
as propagated by the writings of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, i.e. a 
plus-sum situation. However, it is also not win-lose as in protectionist 
measures as propagated by List and his writings on infant industries (a 
zero-sum situation). 
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levels. As Ejersbo has noticed, when it comes to reform efforts, 
large as small, 
“[t]he typical picture is one of great uncertainty about what the 
result of a reform will be. And the larger the reform, the larger 
also the uncertainty… Reforms are rarely as rational and clear 
as the promoters of reform pretend them to be – on the 
contrary… Generally speaking, our knowledge and ability to 
comprehend reforms and their effects is far from as 
comprehensive as the impression given in connection with the 
launching of the reforms”. 
(freely translated from Ejersbo, 2005). 
Then, uncertainty seems to be the keyword as for the effects of 
the reform currently underway in Denmark, and lots of it given 
its size and scope! This is further compounded by our lack of 
knowledge about the previous local government reform, which 
received only scant attention scholarly back in the 1960s and 
70s. This very much makes the thesis a journey into uncharted 
waters albeit navigation is eased well underway by the 
knowledge that does exist on the matter, theoretically and 
empirically. This leads us to the specific questions that the 
thesis will try to provide answers for. 
1.2 MACROCHANGE AND MICROBEHAVIOR – OR: 
STRATEGIZING IN THE LARGE AND THE SMALL2 
Although fundamentally different from its predecessor in a 
number of respects, this second local government reform has 
also had communal amalgamation at its centre which brings us 
to the first part of this thesis’ explanandum: the municipalities’ 
and counties’ financial behaviour in the time leading up to the 
local government reform. Specifically, 236 of the current 270 
municipalities will be amalgamated into 64 new ones, leaving 
34 unaffected and giving a total of 98 new ones per 01.01.2007; 
                                     
2 The terms used in this caption are similar to those of Schelling (#). 
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furthermore, the 14 current counties will be amalgamated into 5 
new regions3.  
When the higher powers engage in the sport of heresthetics 
(Riker, 1986) 4 , tinkering with the rules of the game and 
limiting future admittance to the table (specially to a 103 local 
authorities plus the government), then the players denied access 
can be expected to behave very differently from those that 
aren’t. Stated in different terms, heading for the dustbin of has-
beens can lead to decidedly myopic and short-sighted 
behaviour in spite of its longer-term consequences. Conversely, 
those who retain their seat at the table should not experience 
such a displacement, because they can expect to see the 
morning sun for the many days to come. In contrast to its forty-
year-old likewise bourgeois predecessor, the incumbent 
government has been all too aware of these ‘perverse’ 
incentives, and has instigated various countermeasures to 
circumscribe any such financial wholesale in ‘the locals’. 
Regardless of the effects of these considerations, I forward the 
following problematique for theoretical deliberation and 
empirical investigation: 
Problematique A: does the municipalities’ and counties’ 
financial behaviour stand out in the period leading up to the 
second local government reform – and if so then why? 
As will be explicated in later chapters, the measuring rod for 
‘standing out’ will be both temporal and spatial. The 
problematique thus focuses on the new municipalities’ and 
counties’ financial standing at their moment of (re-)birth; and 
this thesis will try to answer how sound that foundation will be 
in addition to why. 
                                     
3  Three local authorities are designated as both municipalities and 
counties, i.e. Copenhagen, Frederiksberg (which is encapsulated by the 
first-mentioned) and Bornholm. 
4 Or ’strategizing in the large’ if one will (Shepsle & Bonchek, 1997). 
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This brings us to the second part of the explanandum: the 
local government reform’s implications for the service 
provision in the new 103 local authorities, both during its 
implementation as well as afterwards. As likewise explicated in 
later chapters, there are several reasons why we should expect 
to see higher service provisions (and expenditures) in those 
new authorities that are formed on the basis of amalgamations; 
that is, a convergence towards the highest common 
denominator among the groups of amalgamating authorities. 
Conversely, the incumbent government and several of its 
predecessors have for a number of years preached as well as 
practiced fiscal restraint at all levels in the public sector – even 
more so in recent years; this speaks in favour of expecting a 
convergence towards the lowest common denominator among 
the amalgamating authorities. Disregarding the effects of these 
considerations, the second problematique thus focuses on the 
reform’s implications for the new authorities’ expenditure 
levels, be they intended, unintended or perhaps unforeseen: 
Problematique B: will the second local government reform 
affect the levels of service provision and thus expenditures in 
the municipalities and counties – and if so then why?
Although distinct in their own right, the common 
denominator between these two problematiques is that they 
both concern financial issues in the new local authorities. 
Expressed in a single sentence (and admittedly, somewhat 
pessimistically), we might with good reasons fear that the new 
amalgamated authorities will be poorer and more expensive 
compared to their predecessors; and that is the concern that this 
thesis will try to substantiate or put to rest5. 
1.3 ON CHOICE OF THEORY 
As the old saying goes for the bride to be, she should dress in 
something old, something blue, something borrowed, 
                                     
5 or in the great tradition of the social sciences: perhaps a bit of both. 
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something new. Apart from the third accessory, this platitude is 
a fair representation of the author’s theoretical standpoint 
which stresses eclecticism, although retaining a theoretical core 
as the common denominator: that of game theory. This stance 
is easily justified for although much can be said for staying 
within a single, well-defined theoretical framework, taking a 
more pluralistic stance arguably alleviates thinking ‘outside the 
box’ – and thus letting one’s own imagination set the 
theoretical boundaries instead of having those prescribed to you 
via the imaginations of other scholars in the field. Returning to 
the core that will take on the role of theoretical common 
denominator, game theory (as utilized in collective action 
theory): this increasingly popular branch within positive 
political theory can be said to highlight factors not particular to 
a given subject matter, i.e. its contextual, sui generis properties; 
instead, it highlights the ‘decontextualized’ elements that often 
are quite endemic to human agency in general, i.e. “elemental 
conflicts” (Poundstone, 1992). This is where some people err 
(though quite understandably) when they think of game theory 
more as a formalizing tool than an actual theory; for that it is 
albeit analyzing something as general as the number of players 
or the order in which the choose, might very well seem 
atheoretical. Furthermore, this thesis is more outcome- than 
process-oriented, so to speak, focusing less on modelling and 
understanding the bargaining processes in the subject matter, 
and more on the resultants of those negotiations. However, one 
must, if not always then often, include aspects of the former to 
understand how the latter have come about – and this I 
therefore do. 
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I. METHOD, DATA & THEORY 
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2 MATTERS OF METHOD AND DATA 
his chapter takes its point of departure in outlining the 
ontological and epistemological weltanschauung of the 
thesis, and then proceeds to explicate its research design. Next 
follows an account of the subject matter: the Danish public 
sector from its past, over its present and (near-)future. Finally, 
the first part is concluded by an examination of the theoretical 
common denominator between the two problematiques, 
whereas their additional, unique aspects are treated separately 
in later chapters. 
T 
2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN: IN SEARCH OF THE BABY AND 
THE BATHWATER 
I utilize quantitative as well as qualitative data and techniques 
in the thesis’ search for the subject matter’s what, where, when, 
how, and why. To be sure, variation in your included variables 
is something that you actively create, and this is sought both at 
the individual and (amalgamating) group level. However, 
before turning to the matter of variation, much can be said for 
not taking an ‘empirical tabula rasa’ as one’s point of departure 
– and thus solely relying on existing theory to structure your 
study. In the author’s case, several preliminary, explorative 
interviews were conducted to probe into the various aspects of 
both problematiques and to test the ideas and arguments that 
the thesis was initially structured around. Specifically, seven 
open-ended conversations were conducted all with seasoned 
practitioners in the field of Danish local affairs; as for their 
selection, they were handpicked from the administrative sphere 
with the aid of Professor Poul Erik Mouritzen and his 
knowledge of who’s who in local affairs. These preliminary 
inquiries subsequently form the basis for a larger sample. Case 
selection is here given a systematic foundation based on several 
theoretically informed variables; these jointly create the 
variation in the sample along the lines of expected effects of 
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key factors, allowing me to test the validity of the forwarded 
hypotheses as well as their underlying assumptions. Although 
choosing ‘the right’ criteria obviously is of paramount 
importance to both what questions you eventually ask, and the 
answers you receive, the same subject matter can logically be 
partitioned in a plethora of differing ways, all depending on 
your choice of selection criteria, and each creating its own 
unique division of the pool of possible cases. In other words, 
your chosen criterions become your baby which confines the 
remaining ones to the expendable bathwater. Relating these 
remarks to the choice of specific criterions, the cases were 
stratified on the basis of the theoretical expectations as 
developed in sections of later Chapters: firstly, the pool of 
possible cases was defined as the old municipal and county 
division that remains in effect for the fiscal year of 2006 6 . 
Secondly, the pool was firstly partitioned for each 
problematiques along the lines of the chosen criterions, the 
difference between the two being a single criteria on the 
variation in the cases’ liquid assets (the main aspect of 
‘uneconomical conduct’ in the author’s opinion) and their 
service levels at group level cf. below. A single sample of cases 
for both problematiques was then constructed by comparing 
these two partitions (i.e. their intersection) and choosing cases 
with a satisfactory variation on both subject matters7. As for the 
case selection criteria, the theoretical expectations developed 
later leads us to expect the prime explanatory factor (read: 
partitioning) to the individual factor of be whether an authority 
                                     
6 #the old and new divisions are linked via re-election + old division 
pertains to the fiscal year of 2006 and new division to >2006. 
7 As the reader will find when reading the aforementioned chapters, the 
reason for opting for a single sample of cases owes itself to the strong 
similarities in the theoretical reasoning and expectations in both 
problematiques. 
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is amalgamated (1) or not (0), denoted by δi 8 ; see Figure 1 
below. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Municipal Case Selection Criterions of the Stratified 
Interview Sample for Both Problematiques 
The 270 municipalities were thus firstly partitioned into groups 
(read: types) of 236 (1) and 34 authorities (0). As explicated 
later, the hypotheses H1 level are tested along this bipartition 
by observing the difference between the behaviour of the 
municipalities that are amalgamated (type 1XXX in the figure) 
                                     
8 However, as a criterion for case selection, it only makes sense in 
relation to the municipalities, as all of the counties are joined with 
others. 
 The reason for denoting this factor δi owes itself to the expected 
time horizon in the municipalities that are to be amalgamated or not. 
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relative to those that are not (do. 0X, this thus the chosen, 
spatial measuring rod cf. arrow A)9. 
 Next, the pool of possible cases was partitioned for a 
second time by political re-election cf. Chapter 5.3, which 
theoretically is an alternative prime explanatory factor instead 
of amalgamation; that the criterions still are used together owes 
itself to the fact, that the relative measuring rod here is between 
the amalgamating municipalities relative to re-election. In this 
group, re-political election, Ri, is defined as whether a given 
authority’s mayor is re-elected (1) or not (0) as mayor for the 
new amalgamated authority10; this partitioned the pool of cases 
into a total of four groups (00XX, 01XX, 10XX and 11XX). 
 The two aforementioned individual factors were then 
combined with two, theoretically informed, group aspects in 
the amalgamating groups of municipalities, both drawn from 
collective action theory as elaborated later: firstly, the 
authorities were partitioned according to their respective ‘local’ 
group’s size, defined dichotomously as the number of 
amalgamating municipalities either above (1) or below (0) the 
‘global’ mean group size for all 236 (producing the four groups 
of 110X, 111X, 100X and 101X). Finally, a fourth criterion 
                                     
9 A temporal measuring rod is also explicated in the aforementioned 
theoretical chapter, and this alternative operationalization is not 
represented via the case selection but instead by questions. 
10  Two other operationalizations are discussed in Chapter 5.3 but I 
choose this simpler, binary one here. One justification for limiting 
political re-election to the mayoralty is that the interviews in the political 
sphere all were conducted with mayors and not ‘backbench’ councillors. 
 That the non-amalgamating authorities (0XXX) are also partitioned 
according to re-election is to try to take the so-called political business 
cycle into account; this factor is unrelated to the theoretical arguments in 
both problematiques, but its effect needs to be included into the analysis. 
Thus, the inclusion of re-election as a selection criterion in the non-
amalgamating municipalities is an attempt to investigate the general 
effect of re-election on municipal financial behaviour, which must be 
held separate from the effect of the reform! 
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was the degree of group asymmetry in the groups 
amalgamating authorities, defined dichotomously as the 
coefficient of variation between their liquid assets or service 
levels, again either above (1) or below (0) the ‘global’ mean 
group asymmetry 11 ; this gives us the final eight types of 
amalgamating municipalities: 1000, 1001, 1010, 1011, 1100, 
1101, 1110 and 1111. 
 In total, this gives us ten types of municipalities for each 
problematique from which to select the cases for the final 
sample; the stratification via the four criteria thus attempts to 
make the sample representative of the entire pool of cases, that 
is, at least from the viewpoint of the theoretical expectations. I 
have yet to make the final selection of cases. The interviews 
will be repeated in 2007, 2008 and possibly in the beginning of 
2009. The size of the sample will be around 20-30 interviews 
(per annum). So much for the horizontal scope of the sample. 
Vertically, I will try to interview both a high-ranking politician 
(mayor) and official (CEO) in each authority, so the number of 
represented municipalities will be around 10-15 (per annum). 
 
 
 
                                     
11 The theoretical reason for this final criterion is collective action theory 
prescribes group asymmetry as a potential circumscribing effect on 
group size, the third criterion; this also explains the chronological order 
of the two. 
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3 THE PAST, PRESENT AND PROSPECTIVE PUBLIC 
SECTOR IN DENMARK 
3.1 WHERE YOU STAND, DEPENDS ON WHERE  
YOU SIT! 
“The right of municipalities to manage their 
own affairs independently, under State 
supervision, shall be laid down by statute”, 
§ 82 in the Danish Constitution of 1953 
(Folketinget, 1999). 
Future content: this chapter is only two pages long at the 
present but I have included those pages as they are a vital part 
in the theoretical chain of reasoning that follows in later 
chapters. 
As the caption cites Allison for having said (as well as in 
Chapter 0 on page 2), it is not unreasonable to expect that one’s 
concerns, interests and so forth very much are shaped by 
whether you sit behind a desk on capitol hill, partaking in the 
life of Geppetto, or in one of the Pinocchios’ town or county 
councils farther from the pinnacles of central power12. If local 
authorities merely were a provincial extension of central 
government (as is the case in France), then it would arguably 
be more meaningful to examine the relationship between 
different levels of government as a principal-agent problem – 
rather than as a situation of strategic interaction between 
independent parties. However, Danish local authorities do 
enjoy autonomy from their capitol hill, indeed it is (at least 
                                     
12 The literature on this matter is quite extensive and does also not 
pertain to a single field. 
Page 13 
their de jure existence) constitutionally secured as cited 
above13. As Christensen et al notes on the matter: 
“The municipalities [and counties, I might add] are a part of 
the public administration and as such subordinate to 
Parliament. At the same time, the town [and county] councils 
are elected and therefore accountable to the local voters”, 
(freely translated from Christensen et al., 1999). 
So although part of the same public administration, their tasks 
are not the same though each necessary for the other – or in the 
words of the Introduction (on page 2): they are complementary 
opposites as that of yin and yang. This touches on their 
accountability which likewise differs between the two – a point 
that for instance the Danish Economic Council have 
emphasized: 
“The Government will by the voters be held responsible for 
the overall economic development while the local politicians 
normally are judged by other criteria, for example communal 
taxes or the service level”, 
(freely translated from Økonomiske Råd, 2002). 
This means that each has to cater for different concerns and 
interests in the electorate – indeed their respective electorates 
really aren’t the same, the local authorities’ being a subset of 
the Government’s; and their performance is thus also measured 
on different matters Mr. and Mrs. John Q Taxpayer. Take the 
case of the local authorities: on the face of it, their overall 
expenditure levels (child-care, road maintenance and so forth) 
are of course the end result of a vast number of decisions made 
within numerous areas, as Pallesen sensibly notes (2003); in 
this sense, the life of the Pinocchios seems quite similar to that 
of Geppetto. But the former obviously only caters to its own 
electorate, and as one scholar notes: 
                                     
13 The de facto scope of their independence, however, is another story 
and treated in the next chapter. 
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”What counts for the individual town [or county] council is 
not the economy in general. It is particularly considerations 
for the municipality [or county, in my opinion] and its 
economy. If you can get away with not paying then you do so 
gladly”, 
(freely translated from Andersen, 2000b). 
Actually, one might even say that local authorities are required 
by law only to consider the concerns of their respective local 
populations (read: electorate) – at least when no legal 
provisions exist that state otherwise; for as Andersen, writes: 
”Whether the municipalities [or counties] can act without legal 
authority depends on the purpose of the task. The service must 
exclusively benefit the local community[, however]”, 
(Andersen, 2000a; cursive omitted). 
3.2 BACK TO THE FUTURE? THE TEMPORAL TUG-OF-
WAR BETWEEN GEPPETTO AND THE PINOCCHIOS  
“Starting in 1970, Denmark completed the 
most comprehensive modification of the 
political-administrative system since the 
constitution [of 1953]”, 
(freely translated from Bogason, 1997). 
 
”Denmark is at the present engaged in the 
implementation of what has been called the 
largest reform ever of the [Danish] public 
sector”, 
(freely translated from Ejersbo, 2005)14. 
Future content: a descriptive chapter on the evolution of the 
Danish public sector, i.e. decentralization along a temporal 
dimension (taxes and expenditures) and comparatively 
(compared to a number of other OECD counties). The size of 
the public sector over time will also be analyzed, possibly also 
                                     
14 See also #Mouritzen, 2004: 9. 
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comparatively. Additionally, the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the Danish local authorities will also be described, 
both over time as well as comparatively. 
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4 THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND 
’COOPERATIVE MAN’  
his chapter contains the theoretical common denominator 
that exists between the two problematiques. However, it 
firstly delves into various theoretical issues related to the 
theoretical common denominator in the thesis, namely game 
theory. 
T 
4.1 ON THE STRAW MAN HOMO OECONOMICUS 
Future content: reviews and provides a defence for a key 
assumption: rationality. 
4.2 THE SCIENCE ON SCIENCE REVISITED: TENETS OF 
GAME THEORY 
Future content: this chapter will explicate the central tenets of 
game theory and what this means in terms of assumptions. 
4.3 IN BETWEEN HOBBES AND ROUSSEAU: 
PRECONDITIONS FOR ’COOPERATIVE MAN’ 
“In such condition, there is no place for 
Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain; 
and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no 
Navigation, nor use of the commodities that 
may be imported by Sea; no commodious 
Building; no Instruments of moving, and 
removing such things as require much force; no 
Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account 
of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and 
which is worst of all, continuall feare, and 
danger of violent death; And the life of man, 
solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short”, 
(Hobbes, 2002). 
Future content: this chapter will elaborate the necessary 
conditions for collective action, namely that cooperation by 
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achievable (which is not the case in the Hobbesian state of 
nature qua the pure ‘egoism’) as well as fruitful (which is not 
the case in the Rosseauan state of nature qua the general will, 
i.e. the pure ‘altruism’). 
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II. CONFLICTS OVER  
THE COFFERS 
Page 19 
5 GAME OVER? THE SHADOW OF THE FUTURE 
AND THE 2ND LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM 
A brief, introductory note: this chapter has so far only been 
worded to account for one financial variable in relation to 
resource allocation, namely consumption of accumulated 
liquidity. However, there are additional variables that will be 
included at a later time; these are near-liquid assets (sales of 
buildings, land and so forth), expenditures on buildings and 
similar, and borrowing. 
 Also, the game-theoretic element is as of now very slim, 
which is reflected in the formulated hypotheses that pertain to 
the local authorities’ (linearly calculated) payoff functions and 
not the collective outcomes of their actions. 
In what follows, the theoretical chain of reasoning proceeds 
stepwise as is the custom within positive political theory; for as 
Hovi notes: 
”When constructing formal models in general, and especially 
within game theory, it is an established principle that one 
should start by studying a (perhaps strongly) simplified case, 
and then make stepwise expansions in the direction of more 
realistic models. In practice, this means that the researcher 
deliberately utilizes very stringent and unrealistic assumptions 
as point of departure”, 
(freely translated from Hovi, 1992). 
The latter remark is completely congruent with the thesis’ 
weltanschauung and serves at least two purposes: firstly, 
proceeding step by step clarifies the chain of reasoning from 
the perspective of both the recipient and the sender, that is, the 
reader as well as the author. Secondly, one is given the 
opportunity to examine different aspects of the problematique 
from various viewpoints and against varying measuring rods, 
all theoretically founded. Developing your theoretical 
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reasoning step by step and forwarding increasingly complex 
hypotheses thus also holds value from an empirical perspective. 
I will comment further on this in the course of the analysis. 
5.1 THE SHADOW OF THE PAST: LEVIATHAN HARD AT 
WORK 
As elaborated in Chapter 3.2, the Danish local landscape stands 
today before its second major reshuffling in the short span of 
just four decades; and at the centre of both its predecessor and 
the current reform stands the amalgamation of local authorities. 
Also, there has in the years preceding each reform been a 
considerable amount of uneasiness about ‘uneconomical 
conduct’ on the part of the local authorities; so let us begin by 
turning back the clock to Thursday January 1st 1970: the time 
spent in preparation of that reform was considerably longer 
than the present one (commencing in 1956) just as the time 
span of the amalgamations also was considerably longer 
(starting in 1962) 15. But the then (also bourgeois) government 
took few precautionary actions against any uneconomical 
conduct in the local authorities: 
”By the first communal amalgamations there was not yet made 
sufficient financial safeguards in the conditions for the use of 
accumulated liquidity, which led to strange overconsumptions 
with the purpose of securing that the money benefited the 
original population”, 
(freely translated from Asmussen, 2003). 
Although there then were made to systematic, scholarly 
investigations into the scope of these ‘strange 
overconsumptions’, they seem to have been widespread, as 
                                     
15 Then, preparations and planning spanned fourteen years in the 1970 
reform held up against two-and-a-half years in the present one (if the 
work of the Commission on Administrative Structure is omitted).  
Likewise, the amalgamation period spanned eight years in the former 
compared to a mere # years in the latter. 
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several have noted (for example, see Olsen & Kommunernes 
Landsforening, 2004). One of the more wellknown and tragi-
comic examples was that of the 1962 amalgamation of Marstal 
rural parish with Marstal trade post (located on a small island in 
southern Denmark): 
”Marstal trade post was… [geographically speaking] 
completely enclosed by Marstal rural parish… [and when] the 
annexation board had made their principal decision [to 
amalgamate the two] and set out the terms for the annexation, 
then the parish council decided to use all of its accumulated 
liquidity (around 100.000 kroner) on some quite superfluous 
street lighting that only lid up the parish – the urban areas of 
the municipality as well as the actual rural districts. The trade 
post lay still in darkness… Wayfarers from Ærøskøbing [, 
containing the island’s main sea port,] were thus met by a 
‘neon sea’ in the middle of the country road which continued 
into the urban areas but which stopped by the old city 
boundary. From then on you drove into the dark streets of the 
city”, 
Strøm, 1991a: 86, 87. 
Perhaps inspired by this hard-earned, historical lesson, the 
present Government was quick to introduce measures against 
any uneconomical conduct in the local authorities – actually 
introducing them already before the Commission on 
Administrative Structure publicised its report (on the necessity 
and feasibility of a local government reform in the first place). 
On December 22nd 2003 the Government and the National 
Association of Municipalities jointly requested that 
”…the town councils throughout the country carefully 
considered the appropriateness of initiating construction 
projects. At the same time the municipalities were asked to 
report all construction appropriations over 1 mn kroner to the 
Ministry of the Interior and Health with a view to continually 
following developments in activity”, 
#Finansministeriet, 2004a: 12;  
(see also Folketinget, 2004). 
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This approval scheme was thought as a direct precautionary 
measure in connection with a reform at a later time, for  
”The Minister of the Interior and Health has between 
Christmas and New Year’s eve stated that the government is 
very eager to avoid, that considerations on amalgamations 
give rise to additional expenditures not provided for in the 
budgets, financed by drawing on accumulated liquidity. There 
were numerous examples of this in connection with the 1970 
reform and thus should not be repeated in connection with any 
potential, new reform”, 
(freely translated from Olsen & Kommunernes Landsforening, 
2004). 
The scheme was in effect for the fiscal years 2004 and 2005 
(Finansministeriet, 2004) and the subsequent countermeasures 
have been in direct continuation of this measure (Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet, 2006b). It was for the fiscal year 2006 
replaced by Law no. 540 (Folketinget, 2005a) and departmental 
orders 1462 and 1466, which limited the restrictions to local 
authorities that were to be amalgamated (Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet, 2005b; Indenrigs- og 
Sundhedsministeriet, 2005a); however, it was at the same time 
expanded from covering only constructions  to include all 
operations as well, expenditures as well as revenues (Indenrigs- 
og Sundhedsministeriet, 2006b). Furthermore, power of 
approval was with few exceptions decentralized from the 
Ministry of the Interior and Health to integration and 
preparation committees (one for each group of amalgamating 
municipalities and counties, respectively), composed of the 
town and county councillors for the new amalgamated, 
authorities (as elected in the November 16th 2005 elections); 
but let us for the present renege this processual aspect as it will 
be dealt with in detail later in Chapter 5.5. 
 In addition to this was Law no. 549 (Folketinget, 2005b) 
which added several further restrictions for the fiscal year 
2006, respectively on consumption of accumulated liquidity in 
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addition to restrictions on taxation and tax bases, the latter both 
for income revenue, land tax and reimbursement duties 
(Folketinget, 2005b); apart from the first-mentioned these 
restrictions applied equally to both the municipalities and 
counties. Especially interesting for the present matter is the 
compulsory depositing of surplus liquidity, in effect from 
01.10.2005 until 01.01.2007, whose purpose partially concerns 
the fiscal year 2005 but also is in place to “…support 
appropriate financial behaviour in the transitional period 
leading up to the local government reform (freely translated 
from Kommunernes Landsforening & Regeringen, 2005; see 
also the explanatory memorandum for Folketinget, 2005c). 
 The picture that heretofore emerges on the first and 
second local government reform is one of striking contrast as 
both municipalities and counties almost literally have been tied 
by hand and foot in the latter. This indubitably owes itself to 
centrally held fears of behaviour along the lines of carpe diem 
in the local authorities; that is, that they might choose to live 
for the present (read: today) and not the morrow. 
 But how are we to define uneconomical conduct? For 
now I offer quite a wide understanding of the concept as  
”...arrangements made by the existing municipalities and 
counties that directly or indirectly can affect the possible 
arrangements of future municipalities and regions, and where 
these arrangements would not have been made or would have 
had a different content, provided the new units had had power 
of authority”, 
(freely translated from Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet, 
2006b). 
Having answered this question, then the next is to ask whether 
these restrictions afford the municipalities and counties any 
leeway in their financial arrangements – and the answer is in 
the affirmative. However, I have yet to elaborate the actual 
extent of their scope and its specifics. 
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5.2 FIRST THINGS FIRST: THE EFFECTS OF 
AMALGAMATION 
“When you surround an army, leave an outlet 
free. [This does not mean that the enemy is to 
be allowed to escape. The object, as Tu Mu 
puts it, is "to make him believe that there is a 
road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting 
with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds 
pleasantly: "After that, you may crush him."]”, 
Sun Tzu’s Art of War, 6. årh. f.Kr.  
(Tzu & Giles, 1910). 
As Sun Tzu is cited for above, you should always give your 
enemy the impression of having an outlet (but nothing more) 
when surrounding him (or her, of course); otherwise, s/he will 
fight with the courage of despair. A lot of water has passed 
under the bridge since these words were uttered but Sun Tzu’s 
point finds renewed use in the present context. The point with 
the quote is not that Danish local authorities were laid under 
siege by the local government reform – there is little doubt of 
that in the minds of most knowledgeable people within the 
field. No, the point is instead well-captured in the old proverb 
that what the goodwife spares the cat eats, for this is the effect 
of the reform on a large subset of ‘the locals’. Stated in other 
terms, the municipalities and counties can with good reason 
wish to provide against a rainy day, say, if one of the 
authority’s larger, labour-intensive enterprises should choose to 
outsource production to more easterly skies. But how much is 
the cash in the coffer (read: accumulated liquidity) worth when 
you will cease to exist (per 01.01.2007)? Presumably not much! 
Clearly, there are strong incentives for financial drainage in the 
amalgamating authorities. The imminent demise of the great 
majority of municipalities and counties thus means that their 
shadow of the future, the longer-term consequences of their 
present actions, becomes a decidedly sunny affair – or in the 
words of Sun Tzu: they can be expected to fight with the 
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courage of despair for there is no tomorrow for them. In the 
realm of game theory, such temporal effects on actor payoffs 
are called discount factors, δi, i denoting the local authorities 
numerical designation 16 ; further, δi is assumed to lie in the 
interval 17i0 δ 1≤ ≤ . Given a constant discount factor and 
identical time intervals, then actor i’s payoff P  in round n is 
calculated as  (Morrow, 1994; see also Osborne, 2004). It 
seems reasonable to assume that the amalgamating authorities 
are ‘perfectly’ impatient with a discount factor equal to zero, so 
that their accumulated liquidity only has value for them before 
01.01.2007 and thereafter becomes worthless
i
n
i iδ P
18 . Conversely, 
                                     
16 i.e. i = (101, 147, … , 861) = (Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, … , Aars)  
for the old municipalities and i = (1013, 1014, … , 1080) = 
(Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, … , North Jutland) for the old counties, 
designated ‘regions’ in the new division (Kort & Matrikelstyrelsen, 
2004b; Kort & Matrikelstyrelsen, 2004a; Amtsrådsforeningen, 2001). As 
noted in footnote 3 (on page 4), Copenhagen, Frederiksberg and 
Bornholm have status as both municipalities and region, which is why 
they enter into both numerical denominations. 
17 The concept is thus based on the (admittedly somewhat pessimistic) 
assumption that time only can have a negative impact on actor payoffs – 
or at best: no effect (Morrow, 1994). The two logical extremes 
respectively indicate ’perfect’ patience (δi = 1) and ’perfect’ impatience 
(δi = 0), the former because the payoff remains unchanged over time, 
that is, no discounting takes place; in the latter case, the payoff is 
reduced to zero after just one stage which in, say, a bargaining situation 
amounts to uttering the ultimatum that ‘it’s now or never’ (Hovi, 1998; 
Tarar, 2001). 
 The assumption that time only can have a negative, or no, effect on 
actors payoffs owes itself to a lot of the literature that occupies itself 
with discounting. An obvious scholar is Rubinstein and his assertion that 
the negative impact of time owes itself to rising transaction costs; the 
sooner you reach an agreement, the cheaper it is for all involved parties. 
18 I am as of now unsure whether the analysis on resource allocation 
should be confined to the fiscal year of 2006 or also include 2004-05. 
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the authorities that are not affected by amalgamation, here our 
relative measuring rod, are arguably ‘perfectly’ patient with a 
discount factor of 1, as there is no theoretical grounds for 
expecting otherwise; this amounts to assuming that the benefits 
of having a certain amount of accumulated liquidity is equally 
large after 01.01.2007 as before, which seems quite a sensible 
expectation.  
 This gives us a model with a bivariat, unidirectional and 
positive causal connection where consumption of liquidity is 
the dependent variable, Ci, and amalgamation the independent, 
dichotomously coded as δi = {0, 1} = {No, Yes}; discount 
factors are thus simply aligned with whether the authorities are 
to be amalgamated or not; see Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: Consumption of Liquidity and Amalgamation 
Given the restrictions that have been imposed on the local 
authorities cf. Chapter 5.4 (page 33ff), we have to understand 
the expected consumption of liquidity, Ci, relative to the 
possible consumption, Pi, which is calculated as total liquid 
assets per 31.12.2005, Ai, subtracted the required deposition of 
surplus liquidity, Di, that is, 
  i iP A D= − i (6.1). 
The expected consumption of liquidity can then be calculated 
as  
 ( )i i i i i iC P A D= δ = δ − (6.2), 
that is, status as amalgamating authority or not multiplied by 
the (highest) possible consumption of liquidity. The 
expectation is therefore simply that amalgamating authorities, 
δi = 1, will consume as much of their liquidity as possible 
                                                                                                       
Exploratory interview data suggest the former but I leave it an open 
question for now. 
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within the imposed restrictions, i.e. i iC 1 P Pi= ⋅ = . Conversely, 
the authorities unaffected by amalgamation, δi = 1, are expected 
to consume nil, i.e. 0 0i iL M= ⋅ = . 
 The reasoning so far has solely defined the variation in 
the dependent variable, consumption of liquidity, along a 
spatial dimension; that is, across the local authorities depending 
on whether they are amalgamated or not. However, one can just 
as easily understand the chain of reasoning in combination with 
a temporal dimension, which gives us quite a different 
measuring rod: instead of simply comparing the amalgamating 
authorities with those that are left unaffected, the consumption 
of liquidity in each type of authority can be compared at two 
points in time, before 01.01.2007, Ct÷1, and after, Ct. From this 
viewpoint, we should expect consumption of liquidity to be 
higher at the latter point in time relative to the former, that is, 
  ti i i iC C
÷δ > δ t 1
t 1
i
÷
(6.3). 
That amalgamation is included in the inequality owes itself to 
the fact that the argument only holds up for the amalgamating 
authorities, δi = 1, so that the expectation is that 
. Conversely, there is no expectation 
as to any temporal difference in the liquidity consumption of 
the remaining authorities, δ
t t 1 t
i i i1 C 1 C C C
÷⋅ > ⋅ ⇔ >
i = 0, which leads to the non-
sensical expectation that t t 1i i0 C 0 C 0 0
÷⋅ > ⋅ ⇔ > . 
 The next question that begs answering is how to define 
the two points in time, t and t ÷ 1? As already discussed in 
footnote 18 (on page 26), the former is defined as the fiscal 
year of 2006. As for the latter, I have as of now not decided on 
how to define it; but I am thinking about using an average 
measure for the five preceding fiscal years prior to 2006, that is 
average consumption of liquidity from 2001 to 2005. 
 To sum it up, the behavioural expectations set out above 
can be expressed verbally as 
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Hypothesis 1 (H1): for the fiscal year of 2006, the 
consumption of liquidity in the amalgamating local authorities 
is firstly expected to be as high as possible within the frames 
of the centrally imposed restrictions on consumption. 
Conversely, the consumption in the remaining, unaffected 
authorities is expected to be nil. Secondly, it is also expected 
that the amalgamating authorities’ consumption is higher in 
the fiscal year of 2006 compared to that of previous years. 
Then, there is a double yardstick at work here, spatial as well as 
temporal. However, the question is whether we in Stoker’s 
words are looking at the right two trees in the forest (two as the 
preceding model was bivariat)? Although providing theoretical 
grounds for empirically examining consumption of liquidity 
along the dividing line of amalgamation19 , it is nonetheless 
based on a too unrealistic depiction of the problematique; and 
albeit that can be a useful starting point, as Hovi was cited for 
previously (on page 20), it is no more than that: a point of 
departure. Also, despite Friedman’s assertion, that a hypothesis 
must be descriptively false in its assumptions to be important, 
the baby seems so far to be getting the same treatment as the 
bathwater. 
5.3 OPENING UP THE BLACK BOX: THE EFFECT OF RE-
ELECTION 
The problem heretofore is that the chain of reasoning has been 
based on the fallacious assumption, that a municipality simply 
is a municipality, and a county simply a county. In other words, 
they have all been assumed out of the analysis as an 
undifferentiated and exogenously given size. Such unitary actor 
assumptions are very common in political science (for example, 
see Allison & Zelikow, 1999), but holds beyond actually a near 
universal prevalence – if for no other reason than to make an 
otherwise incomprehensibly complex world more tangible 
                                     
19 Recall the second purpose of proceeding step by step as mentioned on 
page 42. 
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(Berger & Luckmann, 1983); the point is illustrated: just pick 
up a given newspaper on a given day and you will find a dozen 
examples of how a given school, municipality, county, 
enterprise or nation is said to have done this or that; however, it 
is people who make decisions, not faceless entities. The point 
in the present context is that it is not the local authorities per se 
that make decisions, but rather the duly elected town and 
county councillors of those entities that act on its behalf (with 
all the vices and virtues that collective action entails, of 
course). Then, it is councillor re-election and not authority 
amalgamation that should have an impact on the consumption 
of liquidity – as thus also function as our relative measuring 
rod. The literature on the subject of rent-seeking politics is 
quite extensive, and for the present the point is that re-elected 
local politicians from the amalgamating authorities can be 
expected to try to counteract any spendthrift emptying of their 
respective town or county coffer(s); the reason is quite simply 
to try to secure a sound financial standing for the new authority 
in which they are a part as a councillor. Conversely, not re-
elected politicians (purposefully or not, it makes no difference) 
have no such longer-term incentives and should therefore take 
on the role of spendthrifts20. I forward that the consumption of 
liquidity can be expected as a function of re-election, Ri, in two 
ways: firstly, as a function of whether a given amalgamating 
authority’s mayor is re-elected as mayor (not just councillor) in 
the new authority, or not; or secondly, as a function not of who 
takes home the mayoralty but of the share of local politicians 
re-elected in the new authority (i.e. mayors and councillors re-
                                     
20 Drawing on classic concepts from budgeting theory, we can say that 
re-elected politicians take on the role of budgetary guardians against 
expenditures, while the not re-elected ones are advocates for 
expenditures (for example, see Brunsson, 1989) 
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elected as either)21. However, both are calculated in the same 
way, as the choice of the one or the other merely affects 
whether the structure of the independent variable is 
dichotomous (the mayoral measure) as Ri = {0, 1} = {No, 
Yes}, or continuous (the councillor measure). The expected 
consumption of liquidity is calculated as 
 ( )i i i i i i i iC R P R A D= δ = δ −  (6.4). 
Again, amalgamation, δi, is included in the equation because 
the argument only applies to the amalgamating authorities, δi = 
1, i.e. 
( ) (i i i i i i i i i i iC 1 R P 1 R A D C R P R A D= ⋅ = ⋅ − ⇔ = = − )i .
                                    
  
Conversely, the expected consumption of liquidity in the 
unaffected authorities, δi = 0, is still zero: 
 
21 Note that neither measure denotes a shift in the level of analysis from 
local authorities to individual councillors. 
 A third possible measure could draw on the extensive literature on 
coalitional theory (#Riker) which would have a decidedly less linear 
take on the consumption of liquidity than the second measure. This third 
possibility will be introduced in the course of the analysis as an 
alternative to the others. 
 It might be appropriate here for a moment to delve into why the 
mayoralty might have a significant impact on local authorities’ financial 
behaviour: generally speaking, mayors (often referred to as ‘city kings’ 
by the political punditry) are in a formidable position in Danish local 
politics for several reasons: most importantly, mayors are near-
impossible to remove from office in between elections (Christensen & 
Espersen, 1983) in all but the most exceptional circumstances cf. § 7, 
subsection 2, and § 66 of the Communal Administration Act. The 
problematic aspects of this near-political immunity became all too clear 
in the spring of 2002 with the case of one of the more controversial 
mayors in Denmark: Peter Brixtofte. 
 Also, the mayor is often the only local politician employed full time 
which in several ways gives him or her advantages over the remaining 
town or county councillors (#). 
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( )i i i i i i iC 0 R P 0 R A D C 0= ⋅ = ⋅ − ⇔ = . 
Notice that the mayoral measure amounts to an expectation 
either of a liquidity consumption of nil (if the mayor has not 
been re-elected as mayor of the new authority) or as much as 
possible within the imposed restrictions (if s/he is re-elected). 
On the other hand, the councillor measure amounts to a linear 
(and assumed perfectly proportional) expectation reflecting the 
share of re-elected councillors; for example, if half of the 
councillors are re-elected to a new authority’s council, then the 
expectation is that haft of the liquidity in their old authority is 
consumed. 
As previously, this model is bivariat with a unidirectional, 
positive causal connection between consumption of liquidity, 
the dependent variable, and re-election, the independent; see 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Consumption of Liquidity and Re-election 
Expressed in words, the expectation is that 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): for the fiscal year of 2006, the 
consumption of liquidity in the amalgamating local authorities 
is positively related to re-election in the new authorities’ 
councils – either defined dichotomously as who takes home 
the mayoralty or continuously as the share of re-elected 
councillors. 
Notice that the variation in the dependent variable, our 
measuring rod, isn’t between the amalgamating and unaffected 
authorities but instead between the authorities in the former 
group. 
 This leads us to consider effects other than those of 
individuals, namely group effects. The potential vices and 
virtues of collective action are well-known and –documented in 
political science, spanning a large array of otherwise widely 
differing fields, and I now turn to these kinds of effects. 
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5.4 THE CONUNDRUM OF RATIONAL MAN AND 
IRRATIONAL SOCIETY: ENTER GROUP EFFECTS 
Future content: this chapter will draw on the literature on 
collective action theory, as formulated by Mancur Olson, and 
introduce group effects into the chain of reasoning. The 
collective action problem with regards to resource allocation is 
to secure the new authorities a sound financial standing at their 
moment of (re-)birth, i.e. from 01.01.2007. Olson’s classical 
argument on group size is elaborated and defined as the number 
of amalgamating authorities in each new authority. This leads 
to an expectation of a positive causal connection between group 
size and consumption of liquidity. This is the first group effect. 
However, group asymmetry is, according to Olson, a 
possible solution to the collective action problem – 
(a)symmetry measured as the dispersion among the 
amalgamating authorities’ possible consumptions, Pi, calculated 
on page 27). This is the second group effect that leads to a 
more optimistic expectation about the liquidity consumption if 
the dispersion in possible consumptions is sufficiently large 
among the amalgamating authorities. 
Another possible solution to the collective action problem 
is that of institutional design which is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
This concludes the theoretical deliberations as for what 
can be expected of the Pinocchios’ behaviour, both their 
deliberate, individual actions and the effects that collective 
action in itself can have. However, as noted in Chapter 5.1 (on 
page 23), the restrictions imposed in the local authorities in 
connection with the current local government reform, also 
entailed an institutional change. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, this processual change can be expected to 
have a significant impact on the outcome of the local 
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authorities’ behaviour, although their individual actions might 
for the better part remain the same22. 
5.5 BIG BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU, PINOCCHIO: 
COMMUNAL BICAMERALISM 
”The Constitution of 1953 abolished the 
[Danish] bicameral system… In Germany, the 
bicameral system’s double principle of 
representation is secured constitutionally. In 
Denmark, it was [de facto] reinstated with the 
local government reform in 1970”, 
(freely translated from Christensen, 1998). 
Future content: I have included two pages on the processual 
changes that the government’s restrictions entail. As elaborated 
here, a processual change occurs for the fiscal year of 2006 
which introduces an element of bicameralism in each of the 
amalgamating, local authorities – and which hinges on the 
pivotal issue from Chapter 5.3, namely political re-election. As 
for the hypothesized behaviour of the local authorities, the 
introduction of this bicameral element leads to an expectation 
that a large subset of the amalgamating authorities might try to 
get away with uneconomical conduct, but that behaviour is 
countered by the respective integration and preparation 
committees. The point is that politicians not re-elected have the 
incentive for uneconomical conduct but not the means (i.e. the 
political power) – and vice versa for the politicians that are re-
elected. 
Family additions are typically joyous occasions which, on the 
face of it, should make the Pinocchios ecstatic about the second 
                                     
22 Also, the heretofore said can to a great extent also account for what 
we would expect of the local authorities’ behaviour in connection with 
the first local government reform in 1970 – save the matters pertaining 
to restrictions on their behaviour, of course. However, this is not true of 
the considerations in the next chapter. 
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local government reform; for they have been blessed with a 
bigger brother, albeit only temporarily for the fiscal year of 
2006. But perhaps there is, in Shakespeare’s words, something 
rotten in the state of Denmark – or at least that might well be 
the local authorities’ take on the arrival of their new sibling. As 
this chapter will elaborate, the central powers at be have for 
2006 taken to the sport of heresthetics and tinkered not only 
with the scope of the Pinocchios’ financial autonomy, as dealt 
with earlier in Chapter 5.1 (on page 21ff); no, Geppetto has 
also tinkered with the very institutional design that binds and 
confines the local authorities – this by decentralizing his 
paternalistic (though arguably well-founded) worrying for the 
wellbeing of his wooden son(s). The following is therefore an 
extension on the aforementioned chapter which elucidated the 
restrictions imposed on the local authorities; but nothing was 
here said on the processual side of Geppetto’s precautionary 
measures – measures that now show their almost Orwellian 
proportions (#Orwell, 1984). 
As Christensen and several others have noted, Denmark 
might formally have abandoned bicameralism in 1953 but it 
was de facto reinstated with the local government reform in 
1970 (see Blom-Hansen, 2002; and Christiansen, 2000). This 
very much has to do with the tendency for minority 
governments in Denmark that, given the lack of clear 
parliamentary majorities, have bolstered themselves by 
involving the local authorities’ organizations as a de facto first 
chamber. The second local government reform has likewise 
introduced an additional bicameral system, now at municipal 
and county level, albeit only temporarily for the fiscal year of 
2006. This means that the amalgamating (!) Pinocchios’ 
traditional ‘unicameralism’, the town and county councils’ 
local sovereignty, is circumscribed for 2006 by ‘bigger 
brothers’ in the form of municipal integration and county 
preparation committees – and in some cases also by the 
Ministry of the Interior and Health (henceforth abbreviated 
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MIH). The former is thus reduced to a first chamber with the 
latter acting as powerful de jure second chambers. This 
‘strategizing in the large’ by Geppetto was laid down in the 
agreement on the local government reform: 
“In order to ensure proper preparation of the merger of 
municipalities, the district councils elected in the merged 
municipalities as a result of the local government election on 
15 November 2005 will act as integration committees in 
2006… The same principles apply to the new regions. Here, 
the newly elected regional councils will act as preparation 
committees in 2006 with the responsibility of preparing 
establishment of the new regions”, 
(Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet, 2006a; cursive added). 
The bicameral system thus functions by pitting some of the 
Pinocchios up against the remaining ones, although the 
dividing line actually isn’t found between authorities, but rather 
within each of them. We are here touching on the pivotal issue 
last spoken of in Chapter 5.3, namely political re-election. 
Sorry for the abrupt ending of this chapter, but this is as far as I 
could get before the paper’s deadline. 
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